Liberals Against Withdrawal

Andrew Sullivan quotes some readers saying some silly things, and then says a few himself:

Another reader writes:

Nice piece by the anti-war liberal who rightly is concerned at the moral implications of withdrawal. But he had a more cogent point when he noted there was a reason Saddam was so brutal – that he had to be to keep a lid on all the centuries of brewing tension. And that’s the problem with staying…we can only bring peace to a unified Iraq by imposing draconian measures on the country, a la Saddam, or by picking a new Saddam and sticking around long enough for him to do so. I don't think it would be moral to do so. Nor do we have the stomach for it. I fear the only outcome that offers a prayer of bringing the violence to a relatively quick end is to partition the country - Kurd, Shia and Sunni - and stick around long enough for each group to get out of the other's territory.

Soft-partition via withdrawal. It may be the best we can do. And it could be leveraged against Iran's leadership.

This is not an accurate representation of reality. The fact is that Sunni and Shia in Iraq got along pretty well under Saddam, despite the targeting of Shia by the dictator. Intermarriage rates were high, and intermingling was common, which is why there were so many mixed neighborhoods in Iraqi cities (some of which have since been ethnically cleansed). The notion of "centuries of brewing tension" is a myth. There had been some incidents of sectarian conflicts across the centuries, just as there has been between Protestants and Catholics, but a primordialist reading of recent events is not productive. This violence was not inevitable.

The probability of sectarian violence went up dramatically under Paul Bremer's leadership. His decision, as head of Coalition Provisional Authority, to disband the state-run industries and de-Baathify the police and military had several adverse effects:

1. It destroyed an already-decimated economy. The U.S. targeting the Iraqi infrastructure during the Persian Gulf War, destroying some 90% of Iraq's power-generating and distribution systems. The sanctions which followed made it impossible for the country to rebuild. What little economic activity remained was dominated by the state-run oil company. The dissolution of state-run companies by Bremer put a large portion of the country out of work almost overnight.

2. This poor economic situation was coupled with a power vacuum; Brewer dissolved the Iraqi police force and military during de-Baathification, and the U.S. did not bring in enough troops to ensure security. This situation, along with the economic degradation, led to an enormous boost in crime rates, hooliganism, and looting, from almost the first moment of U.S. invasion until now. This crime was sometimes done along sectarian lines, or at least was viewed as such. The situation hasn't improved since; most estimates of Iraqi unemployment are in the 70% range. But early on the crime was manifest as looting and theft; eventually, it migrated to ethnic cleansing and suicide-bombing, but that wasn't always the case. People had to be pushed to that end... it wasn't their first reaction.

3. Sectarian nationalists used these incidents, along with high unemployment levels and general economic dissatisfaction, to mobilize members of their respective groups. This was especially noticeable in the Sunni boycott of elections in 2005. Sunnis, as the minority, felt like they would not be able to influence the government, so they decided to not participate in the proceedings. It became a self-fulfilling prophecy, as the Shiite government began passing pro-Shiite policies. Sunnis began to look outside the government (and the U.S. forces, who they rightly viewed as siding with the Shiite government at their expense) for security. (Remember when it was called a "Sunni insurgency"?)

4. Militia leaders could promise salaries to ex-soldiers and police officers who couldn't find employment elsewhere. These men already had training and access to some weaponry. The looting and hooliganism became more organized and targeted, and violence levels subsequently increased.

5. This culminated in the Feb. 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Samarra. At that point, sectarian nationalists had all the ammo they needed to mobilize the citizenry, and the all-out civil war ensued.

Looking at the violence as stemming from centuries-old disputes neglects the lesson on offer here: economic degradation + lack of security = violence. It's similar to the demonization of the Jews by Hitler in Nazi Germany, or the demonization of Hutus in Rwanda, or the demonization of Croats by Milosevic in Serbia, etc. They all used economic degradation to incite and mobilize their consituents against some other ethnic/religious group, and a lack of security or authority made it possible. But the story isn't in theancient ethnic/religious tensions (even if some actually do exist); the story is in the specific socioeconomic and cultural situations, unique in each case.

After all, if it were all about ancient ethnic hatreds, then why aren't Sunni and Shiite fighting anywhere else but Iraq?

Partition solves none of these problems, and may encourage more as Sunni/Shiite/Kurds begin fighting each other over territory and oil fields. In other words, partition may lead to more violence; not less. It solves none of the underlying issues, and may contribute more divisiveness to the situation.