Wednesday, March 19, 2008

The Future of Iraq

On the fifth anniversary of the initiation of conflict, Peter Grier looks at the Iraq War, and wonders where we go from here. His best and worst case scenarios are as follows:

The Iraq war might end like this:

•Iraqi Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds uneasily share power and wealth in a single state. Sectarian violence, as well as terrorism linked to Al Qaeda, are diminished but not eliminated. Overseeing all this are perhaps 30,000 to 50,000 US troops, deployed in Iraq for years, maybe decades.

•Iraq is partitioned, accompanied by a return to the widespread sectarian violence of 2006 – times two.

Five years after the invasion of Iraq, those scenarios might be the best and worse cases that the United States now can aim for. One key to the outcome may be how long the US stays engaged in the expensive, drawn-out conflict.

In the middle, there is still a great deal of uncertainty. And not just uncertainty of outcome, but uncertainty of aims and goals.

Much depends on the attitudes of the various groups toward basic questions of national identity. But even after all this time, the US may not really know whether the Kurds want their own state, whether Shiites will allow true Sunni participation in central government, and whether the Sunnis – Iraq's old ruling class – truly have given up dreams of reconquering the country.

"We don't really have a good fix on what the calculations of all these actors are," said Martin Indyk of the Brookings Institution in Washington during a January seminar on the future of Iraq.

The most crucial unknown: Is the current decline in sectarian violence a real trend – or are Sunnis and Shiites simply rearming and biding their time?

The most realistic best-case endgame?

Taking all these factors into account, success in Iraq at this point might be defined as a unified country that does not offer sanctuary to Islamic militants and is governed by a stable regime that is not under the influence of a hostile foreign power, such as Iran.

That, for example, is the bottom line of Andrew Krepinevich, a veteran Army planner and now president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

Reaching this relatively stable state could take another three to five years – if it can be reached at all. Even then, the US might need to keep a substantial number of troops in the country – to keep Iraq's internal factions from going after one another and to protect the nation from its external enemies.

"A reasonable outcome would find something like 30,000 to 40,000 troops in Iraq for 25 to 50 years," says Dr. Krepinevich in an e-mail.

After all, the US has deployed troops in Germany and Japan for 63 years, and Korea for 57. Might Iraq, in the end, require a commensurate commitment?

In some ways, this is in line with James Fallows' excellent piece in The Atlantic a few years ago, "Declaring Victory". He maintains that the "war" part of Iraq is over, and we would do well to ditch such language and focus on our real task: police-work, infrastructure-building, and establishing lasting institutions for governance. This process will inevitably take decades, and not because Iraq is some unique quagmire. In fact, it will take this long because it almost always takes that long. Thomas Barnett calls this process "Bosnia-done-backwards," and we see the continued trauma and fractionalization of the Balkans to this day. Belgium is going through some of the same issues. But I doubt that anyone would say that the Balkans are in worse shape in 2008 than they were in 1995.

So should we pull the troops out? It depends on the weight of your values. If you believe that American "blood and treasure" is intrinsically more valuable than Iraqi "blood and treasure" simply by virtue of being American, then the answer is inevitably "yes". But if you believe, as I do, that Iraq is better off than it would be otherwise for whatever amount of stability that the U.S. presence provides, then a slow draw-down, with the possibility that 30-40 thousand American troops will still be in Iraq in 20 years, will give Iraq a good chance to emerge as a viable state. Pulling all the troops out now ensures that it will not.

The U.S. has a history of intervening and then dropping out, and the target country then descending into chaos and misery. It happened in Vietnam and Cambodia on a grand scale. But in Korea and the Balkans, a continued U.S./NATO presence has allowed stable institutions to be built over time, and the security of those countries has improved immensely due to the continued U.S. presence. I'm not suggesting that Iraq must only end up on either the S. Korean or Cambodian poles, but the lesson may be clear: a continued security presence can be beneficial for the growth of the country. A quick pull-out almost certainly will not be.

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Wednesday, March 12, 2008

It's Official

The Pentagon finally confirms what we already know: there was no link between Saddam and al-Qaida before 9/11. However, it also confirms what many of us also already knew: there were tons of links between Saddam and other terrorist groups.

An exhaustive review of more than 600,000 Iraqi documents that were captured after the 2003 U.S. invasion has found no evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime had any operational links with Osama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist network.

The Pentagon-sponsored study, scheduled for release later this week, did confirm that Saddam's regime provided some support to other terrorist groups, particularly in the Middle East, U.S. officials told McClatchy. However, his security services were directed primarily against Iraqi exiles, Shiite Muslims, Kurds and others he considered enemies of his regime.

If anyone is still interested in this, Regime of Terror has fairly exhaustively cataloged Saddam's terrorist ties. They have also compiled evidence of cooperation between the remnants of the Ba'ath Party (of which Saddam was a chief member) and al-Qaida post 9/11. In other words, it's not that Saddam's ideology was incompatible with al-Qaida's (or other terrorists'), but rather that they just hadn't hooked up together quite yet.

That said, it's still a pretty damning indictment of the competence/integrity of the Bush administration.

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Wednesday, March 5, 2008

Amazing

Via Matthew Yglesias, watch Hillary Clinton specifically cite her experience in explaining why she was going to vote in favor of the Iraq War "with conviction".

Of course, now she is saying that her experience will prevent her from making exactly these sorts of mistakes. Perhaps Obama's never-ending faith in "hope" and "change" as panacea, but Clinton is obviously doing the same thing with her "experience" and "tried and tested" tropes. This election is not Change vs. Experience; it's about judgment and policy.

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Thursday, November 15, 2007

IR in Theory and Practice

Daniel Drezner jumps into a debate about the utility of International Relations Theory, particularly as it pertains to students getting policy M.A. degrees:

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Rob Farley have fired additional volleys on the utility of an M.A. in international relations.

Except that with this round, the debate is actually about something more fundamental -- the utility of international relations theory to policymaking.

These paragraphs suggest where Jackson is coming from:

[W]here it gets controversial is the relationship between scholarship and object. We have two ideal-typical positions on this: scholarship ought to improve practice, and scholarship can't possibly improve practice, at least not directly. Rob clearly prefers door #1; I prefer door #2. Rob's position is the classic Enlightenment hope for the sciences of society: place practice on a more rational basis, achieve better results, produce a world that looks more like the world we want to live in; I think that's both dangerous and a little naive -- dangerous because it puts a potential transcendental justification for coercion in the hands of would-be reformers (after all, if the experts told us that we can do this, and you disagree, then you're either stupid or obstinate, and in either way you're in the way so forcibly removing you starts to look like a good idea) and naive because it presumes that scholarly knowledge translates more or less simply to the actual world (and once again, if it doesn't, maybe we ought to use force to make the world look more like the model . . .).

I prefer option #2 -- scholarship can't possibly improve practice, at least not directly -- in part because people claiming to have Reason/God/Truth on their sides ("Jesus/Buddha/Muhammad/science likes my policy better!") have been responsible for most of the senseless death in human history, in part because systematic scholarly knowledge is by nature an abstraction (and sometimes a severe abstraction, in which the actual practice of anyone in particular disappears -- the sports analogy here would be to sabremetric analyses of baseball, and we've seen what happens when actual baseball teams try to directly implement strategies that look valid sabremetrically) and therefore not fit for any sort of direct translation into practice, and in part because scholarly knowledge is irreducibly perspectival and thus does not seem to me to be a good solid basis for decision-making (although it can certainly inform decision-making as one element among others).

Farley's response to this is here. My response is below the fold....

From this excerpt, I've concluded that Jackson is likely correct that he should not be teaching anyone in an M.A. program. I am more skeptical that this stricture should be applied to others.

The problem with Jackson's argument is that it sets up a false dichotomy. Neither ideal type holds, and most profs in policy schools are smart enough to know that. International relations theory provides some useful constructs through which one can interpret world politics. Now -- and this is important -- they are far from perfect. Most IR theories -- hell, most social science theories -- do a much better job at after-the-fact explanation than before-the-fact prediction. In teaching them, therefore, one has to be wary of having your students believe that what they are learning is some sort of gospel. [This, by the way, is one reason why an M.A. has value-added -- most M.A. students eventually realize that sometime there is no right answer to a question. B.A. students are more reluctant to believe that the Wizards of IR are not all-powerful.]

Why teach theory at all, then? Two quick answers. First. to paraphrase Churchill, IR theory is a lousy rotten way of understanding the world -- until you consider the alternatives. Policymakers who claim to disdain abstract theories just use implicit ones -- poorly chosen historical analogies, bad metaphors, you name it. Jackson's "intellectually isolationist" approach to teaching policy doesn't make the situation any better -- it just deprives would-be policymakers of a component in their analytical tool kit.

Second, good teachers don't just teach the strengths of a particular theoretical approach -- they also teach the weaknesses and blind spots of each approach. This is the "procedural liberalism" that Michael Berube is so fond of. As Farley puts it:

Why wouldn't it be better if the policymakers in question had some theoretical training, such that they could, on their own, evaluate elements of the claims that the scholars are making? This IS teaching students; it's teaching students to be better, more critical policymakers.
Teaching students theoretical concepts and how to critique them is a two-fer. Hopefully, it provides them with some useful knowledge about how the world works. More importantly, however, it should teach them how to judge for themselves about how the world works. That's the best way to get students to temper the idealism that scares the crap out of Jackson.

Oh, one last point -- Jackson's sabremetric metaphor is crap. The Boston Red Sox have been successful in the past half-decade because of a combination of sabremetric analysis, traditional scouting, and a larger budget to fill out the roster. Sabremetrics was not solely responsible -- but without it, there's no way they win two World Series either.

This is how IR scholarship should be viewed as well -- an insufficient but necessary base of knowledge from which one can craft effective policies.



first of all, the word is "sabermetrics," not "sabremetrics".

secondly, a better example of sabermetric success would surely be the Oakland A's, who are perennial contenders despite having a very small (relative) budget. Billy Beane operates almost purely on sabermetric knowledge.

thirdly, the most telling evidence that sabermetrics is successful is that... every team in baseball now uses these metrics. Some give them more relative weight than others, and some have big enough budgets to make some "mistake signings" and absorb the blow, but all teams use sabermetrics now, especially in drafting. The early adopters have had the most success. Now, the gains are marginal, but the consequences of ignoring sabermetrics would likely be disastrous.

Now, to the topic at hand: clearly Drezner is right. Jackson sets up a straw man within a false dichotomy, and of course has no trouble knocking it down. but IR Theory, like any other theory in any other discipline, has value in setting parameters for understanding actual situations. Some theories demonstrate some predictive power, and those theories are kept and (hopefully) refined. Others don't. And, to quote Keynes, as the facts change, good scholars (or policy-makers) should change their minds. Dogmatic defense of theory in spite of all evidence to the contrary is clearly counter-productive, but so is ignoring the theoretical debate altogether in favor of flying blindly.

It seems clear not that the Bush administration's misadventure in Iraq is not the fault of their application of a theory, but of applying the wrong theory. It was their ignorance of the broad theoretical discussion in favor of dogmatic approval of one theory -- neoconservatism as a model for the Middle East -- that cost them, not their knowledge.

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Tuesday, November 6, 2007

Another Bush Achievement

Turkey's threatened incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan had me nervous a few weeks ago. Now, Bush has achieved a modest victory on that front, after engaging in some of that good 'ole diplomacy of which he is usually not capable:

Fortunately for both sides, yesterday's White House encounter produced a solution that allowed both sides to step back from the brink. Bush not only declared the Kurdistan Workers' Party (or PKK), "an enemy of Turkey, a free Iraq and the United States," but also committed to providing actionable intelligence to Ankara on the whereabouts of PKK positions. Officially, Bush publicly stuck to the line that Iraq's territory should not be violated. In practice, though, the United States would cooperate "in order to chase down people who murder people," Bush pledged. Essentially, that appears to be a green light for the Turks to carry out limited raids into Iraqi territory with the blessing of the United States. And, crucially, it also allows Erdogan to call off a full-scale land invasion—though he stressed that that option remained on the table if raids proved unsuccessful.

"Finally, we have a plan of action," says one senior Turkish official not authorized to speak on the record. "We are tired of promises with no action."

Getting to this agreement was the result of weeks of intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy by the administration.
(ht: Daniel Drezner)

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Saturday, November 3, 2007

Uh Oh

I was really hoping this wouldn't happen:

Gen. Pervez Musharraf suspended Pakistan's constitution and deployed troops in the capital Saturday, declaring that rising Islamic extremism had forced him to take emergency measures that included replacing the nation's chief justice and blacking out the independent media that refused to support him.

Authorities began rounding up opposition politicians despite calls from Washington and other Western allies not to take authoritarian measures.

The U.S. called for Musharraf to restore democracy. However, the Pentagon said the emergency declaration does not affect U.S. military support for Pakistan and its efforts in the war on terrorism. Britain said it was deeply concerned.

Two of our biggest allies in the Middle East -- Turkey and Pakistan -- are becoming less and less reliable.

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Tuesday, September 18, 2007

New Poll of Iraqis

An interesting new poll of Iraqis gives some interesting results:

The results of the poll reflect a great degree of dissatisfaction with the US "surge", with a vast majority of respondents considering the move to have made the situation in the country worse rather than better.

...

The latest poll data reflects a slight increase in the number of respondents who consider al-Qaeda and foreign jihadis responsible for fomenting violence.

There was a significant reduction from February to August 2007 in the numbers who believe that the US and coalition forces are mainly to blame.

...

The autumn 2007 poll reflects growing disillusionment with the occupying forces' presence in Iraq. There is a growing consensus among respondents that coalition troops should leave the country immediately.

Some 47% of respondents now back an immediate withdrawal, compared with 35% in February.

...

One of starkest statistics from the poll is the overwhelming support for attacks on coalition forces among Iraq's minority Sunni population; 93% of those surveyed said they considered it acceptable. By the same majority - 93% - respondents reject violence against Iraqi forces.

The polls aren't as clear-cut as they might seem at first glance. For example, in the second graph, many fewer respondents thought in Aug. '07 that the U.S. government is responsible for the violence in Iraq than thought the same in Feb. '07. The shift is actually pretty striking. So, if the people think that violence has gone up, but fewer people think that the U.S. is to blame for it... it's a bit of a mixed message. Similarly, the number of those who think that al-Qaeda/foreign jihadis are responsible for the uptick in violence has increased from Feb. to Aug., as has the number of those who blame their own government. The number of those who blame "sectarian disputes" has also sharply decreased, which is a good sign for those still hoping for some sort of sectarian reconciliation.

Perhaps most tellingly, 47% of Iraqis support immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces... but 53% don't, preferring the U.S. to stay "until security is restored" or some variant of the same. Those in favor of immediate withdrawal have increased their numbers since Feb., but they are still the minority. this is a key point.

Strikingly, 93% of Iraqis think that attacks against Iraqi troops are not justified, while 57% think that attacks against U.S. troops are justified (although those numbers are heavily skewed by Sunnis). Only 18% of Sunnis think attacks against Iraqi troops are justified, despite the fact that these troops are majorly comprised of Shiites. Other questions yield similarly mixed results.

The upshot: Sunnis say they want a strong unified state (but have largely boycotted the central gov't, indicating that they want some other type of strong unified state than is currently in place), Shia split their support between a strongly unified state or a confederal system, while the Kurds want their independence. This is the primary crux of the political problem... reconciling those three views. But, as we can tell, partition isn't going to fix it, since the Sunnis would be inclined to continue violence until reunification occurred. Similarly, the Kurds seem unlikely to cede regional autonomy under any system. These views have nothing to do with President Bush or the invasion; they are influenced by history and culture and the current security dilemmas and credible commitment problems.

Perhaps the strongest thing to take away from this poll is that Iraqis don't really like being dominated by foreigners, be they jihadists or Americans. This signifies that there is still a strong sense of national unity, even though it clearly manifests itself in different ways. Still, that's really positive; perhaps it can be built on. We've seen snippets of this at other times, like when the Iraqi soccer team won the Asian Cup. The outward displays of nationalism was impossible to miss.

Still, and as always in Iraq, the truth of the situation is much more nuanced than a quick glance would indicate. But there appears to still be some hope buried in these poll numbers.


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Saturday, September 15, 2007

Is the Surge Working?

The answer to that question heavily depends on the metric one is using. In one sense, Pres. Bush and his defenders are right: violence is down in Baghdad and Anbar, and there isn't any corresponding increase in other regions. In another, Pres. Bush's detractors are also correct: this decrease in violence has not led to social improvements (i.e. the power still isn't on; unemployment is still very high; the oil is still not being pumped), and the fact that the violence has decreased might be more correlation than causation anyway.

Michael Greenstone, an economist as MIT, has recently concluded a study on the matter. He acknowledges the security and military successes of the surge, but finds an interesting result:

This paper shows how data from world financial markets can be used to shed light on the central question of whether the Surge has increased or diminished the prospect of today's Iraq surviving into the future. In particular, I examine the price of Iraqi state bonds, which the Iraqi government is currently servicing, on world financial markets. After the Surge, there is a sharp decline in the price of those bonds, relative to alternative bonds. The decline signaled a 40% increase in the market's expectation that Iraq will default. This finding suggests that to date the Surge is failing to pave the way toward a stable Iraq and may in fact be undermining it.
Financial markets represent the aggregated common wisdom of those who are willing to put their money where their mouth/brain is. Couple this with the fact that some foreign oil companies are making deals directly with the Kurdish regional government, rather than the national Iraqi government, and the consensus in the financial sector seems to be that the chance of the a collapse of the Iraqi government have gone up in the past 6-7 months. Obviously this process may have been underway well before the surge began. But it doesn't appear that the surge has been successful in obviating this risk.

Political commentators would be wise to take note; it's never a good idea to bet against the financial markets.

(ht: Freakonomics)

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Thursday, September 13, 2007

Iraqi Oil Deal Disintegrating?

Some discouraging news from Baghdad:

A carefully constructed compromise on a draft law governing Iraq’s rich oil fields, agreed to in February after months of arduous talks among Iraqi political groups, appears to have collapsed. The apparent breakdown comes just as Congress and the White House are struggling to find evidence that there is progress toward reconciliation and a functioning government here.

Senior Iraqi negotiators met in Baghdad on Wednesday in an attempt to salvage the original compromise, two participants said. But the meeting came against the backdrop of a public series of increasingly strident disagreements over the draft law that had broken out in recent days between Hussain al-Shahristani, the Iraqi oil minister, and officials of the provincial government in the Kurdish north, where some of the nation’s largest fields are located.

Mr. Shahristani, a senior member of the Arab Shiite coalition that controls the federal government, negotiated the compromise with leaders of the Kurdish and Arab Sunni parties. But since then, the Kurds have pressed forward with a regional version of the law that Mr. Shahristani says is illegal. Many of the Sunnis who supported the original deal have also pulled out in recent months.

The oil law — which would govern how oil fields are developed and managed — is one of several benchmarks that the Bush administration has been pressing the Iraqis to meet as a sign that they are making headway toward creating an effective government.

Again and again in the past year, agreement on the law has been fleetingly close before political and sectarian disagreements have arisen to stall the deal.

One of the participants in Wednesday’s meeting, Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih, who has worked for much of the past year to push for the original compromise, said some progress had been made at the meeting, but that he could not guarantee success.

“This has been like a roller coaster,” said Mr. Salih, who is Kurdish. “There were occasions where we seemed to be there, where we seemed to have closure, only to fail at that.”

“Given the seriousness of the issue, I don’t want to create false expectations, but I can say there is serious effort to bring this to closure,” he said.

This isn't a good thing, but it may not be as catastrophic as some commentators seem to think. After all, this is a legislative battle, not a military one. This sort of compromise will be perpetually necessary if the Iraqi government is to generate and sustain any sort of legitimacy. The fact that the sides seem pretty close to a deal, and in fact had a tentative agreement in place, points positively to the fact that negotiations are taking place. The negative aspect, of course, is that these negotiations have not led to any legislation at this point. But the same could be said of the recent U.S. immigration battles, or Congress' inability to pass resolutions asking the President to withdraw combat troops from Iraq, or any number of other pieces of legislation that ended up DOA.

This is the nitty-gritty of representative democracies. This is a real and substantive test of the strength and validity of the Iraqi government. If they can eventually produce an oil-sharing agreement that has broad-based support from all sides, then the government may be on a path towards relevance. If not, then the ballgame is over. But the fact that this is taking a long time doesn't mean that there is no chance for a positive result. The legislative game is slow; reaching agreement takes a lot of time. We should continue to pressure the Iraqis to come to agreement as quickly as they can, but we must do so while recognizing that oil is the most important issue in Iraq, and this is the first experiment with such far-reaching legislation in the nation's history. Realistic expectations are necessary.

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Why No Attacks?

Megan McArdle finds Amy Zegart warning people not to jump to conclusions -- like, the Bush admin. anti-terrorism policy must be working because we haven't had any terrorist attacks since 9/11 -- since causality is much different than correlation. Ms. McArdle runs through other possibilities unrelated to Bush's policies to explain why attacks might not have occurred, mostly demographic, attitudinal, and legal factors, but ignores one big one: we have been attacked. Not "we" as in the U.S. proper, but I think it's silly to assume that the U.S. proper is al-Qaeda's only target. It isn't. But there have been attacks in the U.K., Spain, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many developing countries. Not all of these are directly associated with al-Qaeda (tho some probably are), but they are representative of the larger jihadist movement. Part of this was bin Laden's intent: to radicalize other Muslims, even if it wasn't under his banner specifically.

The U.S. is too isolated for a lot of attacks on the mainland. But our allies have been hit, as have other regimes that jihadists despise. This fact is often lost, but it shouldn't be.

Elsewhere, Ms. McArdle has a pretty strong primer on taxes, how they influence incentives, and why tax deductions are worse than tax cuts.

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R.I.P., Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha

He may not have been the world's nicest guy, but there are a serious lack of them in Iraq right now. He was a pragmatic leader, and empowering him -- and other Sunni tribal leaders -- as a counter-balancing force to the Shiite militias is the best chance we've got for creating any sort of lasting peace and working government. Hopefully, Abdul-Sattar's murder will galvanize others to take his place, will elicit sympathy from those previously predisposed against him, and lead to a stronger push against terrorism and for political solutions.

I'm not necessarily hopeful that this will happen, but it's worth hoping for.

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Wednesday, September 5, 2007

Iraqi Police Not Doing Well

In fact, there are doing so poorly that a study led by fmr. Marine Core Gen. James Jones suggests that they should be disbanded. Ouch:

Iraq's security forces will be unable to take control of the country in the next 18 months, and Baghdad's national police force is so rife with corruption it should be scrapped entirely, according to a new independent assessment.

...

The report also offers a scathing assessment of Baghdad's Ministry of Interior and recommends scrapping Iraq's national police force, which it describes as dysfunctional and infiltrated by militias.

These units "have the potential to help reduce sectarian violence, but ultimately the (Iraq Security Force) will reflect the society from which they are drawn," according to the report, a copy of which was obtained by The Associated Press. "Political reconciliation is the key to ending sectarian violence in Iraq."


The military, however, is doing better.

The 20-member panel of mostly retired senior military and police officers concludes that Iraq's military, in particular its Army, shows the most promise of becoming a viable, independent security force with time. But the group predicts an adequate logistics system to support these ground forces is at least another two years away.

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Monday, September 3, 2007

Interesting Bush Revelation

Buried in a mostly-inconsequential article on Bush's state of mind last December, and his plans for the future, there is a very interesting anecdote:

Mr. Bush acknowledged one major failing of the early occupation of Iraq when he said of disbanding the Saddam Hussein-era military, “The policy was to keep the army intact; didn’t happen.”

But when Mr. Draper pointed out that Mr. Bush’s former Iraq administrator, L. Paul Bremer III, had gone ahead and forced the army’s dissolution and then asked Mr. Bush how he reacted to that, Mr. Bush said, “Yeah, I can’t remember, I’m sure I said, ‘This is the policy, what happened?’ ” But, he added, “Again, Hadley’s got notes on all of this stuff,” referring to Stephen J. Hadley, his national security adviser.

It would be nice to actually see those notes, but the point is important. Earlier in the piece, Bush takes full responsibility for the decision to go to war in Iraq ("This group-think of ‘we all sat around and decided’ — there’s only one person that can decide, and that’s the president"), but apparently delegated all authority over the occupation to Bremer, to the point that he was actually surprised and dismayed by Bremer's management. It's amazing to me that Bush was so disconnected from the actual policy decisions of the CPA, and it may have doomed the entire Iraq enterprise. The decision to put all authority in the hands of Bremer instead of splitting it with Khalilzad as initially planned had worse ramifications than Bush could've imagined, but the decision to do so still falls on him.

So, why did Bush give Bremer the Presidential Medal of Freedom?

UPDATE: Paul Bremer calls Pres. Bush a liar. He says that Bush knew about the plan to dissolve the Iraqi army, and he's got letters to prove it:

A previously undisclosed exchange of letters shows that President Bush was told in advance by his top Iraq envoy in May 2003 of a plan to “dissolve Saddam’s military and intelligence structures,” a plan that the envoy, L. Paul Bremer, said referred to dismantling the Iraqi Army.

...

After recounting American efforts to remove members of the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein from civilian agencies, Mr. Bremer told Mr. Bush that he would “parallel this step with an even more robust measure” to dismantle the Iraq military.

One day later, Mr. Bush wrote back a short thank you letter. “Your leadership is apparent,” the president wrote. “You have quickly made a positive and significant impact. You have my full support and confidence.”

On the same day, Mr. Bremer, in Baghdad, had issued the order disbanding the Iraqi military. Mr. Bush did not mention the order to abolish the military, and the letters do not show that he approved the order or even knew much about it. Mr. Bremer referred only fleetingly to his plan midway through his three-page letter and offered no details.

...

Mr. Bremer indicated that he had been smoldering for months as other administration officials had distanced themselves from his order. “This didn’t just pop out of my head,” he said in a telephone interview on Monday, adding that he had sent a draft of the order to top Pentagon officials and discussed it “several times” with Mr. Rumsfeld.

A White House official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the White House is not commenting on Mr. Draper’s book, said Mr. Bush indeed understood the order and was acknowledging in the interview with Mr. Draper that the original plan had proved unworkable.

“The plan was to keep the Iraqi Army intact, and that’s accurate,” the official said. “But by the time Jerry Bremer announced the order, it was fairly clear that the Iraqi Army could not be reconstituted, and the president understood that. He was acknowledging that that was something that did not go as planned.”

So let's see those notes, Mr. Hadley.

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N. Korea Abandons Its Nuke Program

So sayeth the Grey Lady:

The top American negotiator with North Korea said today that the country had agreed to disable its main nuclear fuel production facility by the end of the year and to account to international monitors for all of its nuclear programs, including what American intelligence agencies believe was a second, secret program purchased from Pakistan.

At the end of a two-day meeting in Geneva — exactly the kind of one-on-one session that the Bush administration had refused to hold in recent years — Christopher R. Hill, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said that the two sides had agreed on what would be a speedy next step, following action by the North this summer to turn off its main nuclear reactor.

“One thing that we agreed on is that the D.P.R.K. will provide a full declaration of all of their nuclear programs and will disable their nuclear programs by the end of this year, 2007,” Mr. Hill told reporters in Geneva, according to the Associated Press. He was using the initials for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the North’s formal name.

But in a separate news conference, his counterpart, Kim Kye-gwan, who heads the North Korean negotiating team, made no mention of an end of the year deadline. He spoke instead of an accord to disable North Korea’s equipment and provide an accounting of its facilities, fuel and weapons in return for what he called “political and economic compensation.”

A few things here. First, the Bush admin. should get credit here. In fact, this continues a series of foreign policy successes since 2001. The Iraq disaster and Iran war-mongering get all the headlines, but Bush convinced Libya to give up its nuclear program, forced the removal and arrest of A.Q. Khan (who had sold weaponry, including nuclear devices, off the shelf to Iran, Libya, N. Korea, and was trying to sell to Saddam) in Pakistan, rallied the international community to put strong pressure on Iran to give up its nuclear program, and has now bribed the D.P.R.K. into abandoning its nuclear ambitions. These are subtle victories, but substantial ones, all of which eluded Pres. Clinton. Some credit is due here.

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Friday, August 31, 2007

Wha???

Apparently, Iyad Allawi's bid to once again become the Prime Minister of Iraq has received a surprising endorsement... from the Baath Party. Yes, that Baath Party. As in, the one that Saddam Hussein belonged to when Allawi attempted to assassinate Saddam.

I'm missing something.

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Wednesday, August 29, 2007

George W. Bush: Emperor of America in Iraq?

Matthew Yglesias points us to Mark Kleiman who send us over to Hullabaloo, where Bidby posts an article written by Philip Atkinson and published by Family Security Matters, in which it is argued that George W. Bush should unleash hellfire on Iraq, dropping nukes on the country until they all surrender or are killed, annexing the country, forcing out all the Arabs and moving Americans in, and then declaring himself President-for-Life, ruling from Baghdad. This is to be done Julius Caesar style.

Family Security Matters -- which has Barbara Comstock, Monica Crowley, Frank Gaffney, Laura Ingraham, and James Woolsey on its board -- seems to be an off-shoot of Gaffney's Center for Security Policy. They've been spending a lot of time scrubbing their site of this and other articles, but Hullabaloo has the full text. Apparently, this isn't a joke.

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Monday, August 27, 2007

U.N. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad Doesn't Like the Job Pres. Bush Has Done

Esp., Ambassador Khalilzah doesn't like the decision to institute Paul Brewer as Supreme Commander of Iraq in 2003. Condi and Powell didn't like it either. They esp. don't like the fact that none of them were told of the decision until it had been announced. Brad DeLong points us to the NY Times:

Zalmay Khalilzad... has fared better than most of the Bush brigade. As a Beirut-educated, Farsi-speaking Sunni Muslim, he actually has a clue about the Islamic world.... In his shepherding of Hamid Karzai to power in Kabul, his forging of Sunni cooperation now bearing fruit in Iraq’s Anbar Province, and in his recent prodding of the U.N. to a fuller Iraqi role....

I was intrigued to find Zal looking back in anguish. President Bush now alludes to “the mistakes that have been made,” but is unspecific. There’s such an array, everyone has a favorite: a nonexistent casus belli, skimpy troop levels, the end of the Iraqi army, aberrant planning.

Khalilzad’s anguish centers on May 6, 2003. That’s the day he expected Bush to announce his return to Iraq to convene a grand assembly — something like an Afghan loya jirga — that would fast-forward a provisional Iraqi government. Instead, the appointment of L. Paul Bremer III to head a Coalition Provisional Authority was announced. Khalilzad, incredulous, went elsewhere. In the place of an Afghan-American Muslim on a mission to empower Iraqis, we got the former ambassador to the Netherlands for a one-year proconsul gig. “We had cleared both announcements, with Bremer to run things and me to convene the loya jirga, both as presidential envoys,” Khalilzad told me. “We were just playing with a few final words. Then the game plan suddenly changed: we would run the country ourselves.... Powell and Condi were incredulous. Powell called me and asked: ‘What happened?’ And I said, ‘You’re secretary of state and you’re asking me what happened!’ ”

Powell confirmed his astonishment. “The plan was for Zal to go back,” he said. “He was the one guy who knew this place better than anyone. I thought this was part of the deal with Bremer. But with no discussion, no debate, things changed. I was stunned.”

The volte-face came at a Bush- Bremer lunch that day where Bremer made a unity of command argument to the Decider. “I put it very directly to the president: you can’t have two presidential envoys running around Iraq,” Bremer told me....

Khalilzad[:]... "We could have had an interim Iraqi government. I argued, based on Afghanistan, that with forces, diplomacy and money, nothing can happen anyway without your support.”

Powell agrees. “Everything was Bremer, the suit, the boots, the whole nine yards.” It was a mistake not to move “more rapidly to putting an Iraqi face on it.”

Khalilzad and Powell are right.... This was the sledgehammer approach. And chosen over lunch. “Unfortunately, yes, the way that decision was taken was typical,” Powell said. “Done! No full deliberations. And you suddenly discover, gee, maybe that wasn’t so great, we should have thought about it a little longer”...



Oops. Guess we should've talked to the experts before changing major aspects of our post-invasion strategy over a lunch meeting. Since most of the worst policy decisions in Iraq occurred under Bremer's watch, Bush's decision to trust his gut in this regard was one of the worst decisions in the history of the American presidency.

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Thursday, August 16, 2007

Ezra Klein Is Not Making Sense

Unfortunately for him, Good Klein sometimes gets too caught up in hyperbole. He is a smart and (usually) reasonable man, but he has written a horrible blog post:

Before America invaded Iraq, George Packer wrote an article for The New York Times Magazine on the liberal hawks that sought to categorize the pro- and anti-war arguments. Given that you often hear war supporters say that the doves opposed this war for the wrong reasons, it's interesting to see what Packer considered the arguments of the two sides:
For War

1. Saddam is cruel and dangerous.
2. Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction and has never stopped trying to develop them.
3. Iraqis are suffering under tyranny and sanctions.
4. Democracy would benefit Iraqis.
5. A democratic Iraq could drain influence from repressive Saudi Arabia.
6. A democratic Iraq could unlock the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate.
7. A democratic Iraq could begin to liberalize the Arab world.
8. Al Qaeda will be at war with us regardless of what we do in Iraq.

Against War

1. Containment has worked for 10 years, and inspections could still work.
2. We shouldn't start wars without immediate provocation and international support.
3. We could inflict terrible casualties, and so could Saddam.
4. A regional war could break out, and anti-Americanism could build to a more dangerous level.
5. Democracy can't be imposed on a country like Iraq.
6. Bush's political aims are unknown, and his record is not reassuring.
7. America's will and capacity for nation building are too limited.
8. War in Iraq will distract from the war on terrorism and swell Al Qaeda's ranks.

So far as I can tell, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 on the pro-war case proved to be entirely wrong. The remaining rationales were that Saddam is a tyrant -- true, but not nearly reason enough to go to war -- and that Iraqis were suffering under sanctions. Our sanctions.

Meanwhile, literally every element of the anti-war case has been proven correct, save for four, which has proven accurate in a low-grade way as Iran has sought to increase its control over its destabilized neighbor.

These were the two cases. They existed -- both of them -- before the conflict. They had, as Packer details, high profile adherents. The anti-war case was internally coherent, rigorous, and in the final analysis, utterly correct. Not accidentally correct, but accurate in its particulars and predictions. No wonder those who got it wrong are so anxious to argue that nobody truly got it right.

A few problems with this. First, numbers 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8 of the pro-war case are not "entirely false". As example, take #2: "Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction and has never stopped trying to develop them." Obviously, this is not entirely false, since Saddam had used weapons of mass destruction on his own citizens and on Kuwaitis. This is not a point of debate. In addition, there is still strong evidence that Saddam was still pursuing WMD (from his own nuclear scientists, who handed over centrifuges to U.S. troops) and other conventional weapons which he was not permitted to have according to U.N. resolutions (e.g. attempting to purchase cruise missiles off the shelf from A.Q. Khan in Pakistan). Saddam had routinely thrown out or harassed U.N. weapons inspectors. This second point might be debatable, but it's certainly not "entirely false".

#4 hasn't proven to be "entirely false" either, since there has never been democracy in Iraq. The system of government put in place by the Iraqi constitution is consociational, not at all a true democracy. Consociational arrangements can sometimes work (although the point is arguable), but it can also exacerbate pre-existing ethnic/sectarian divisions. In this case, it seems to have done so, and a more democratic system (like single-member districting, for example, which could force representatives to gain approval from segments of all ethnic/sectarian groups, thus fostering a moderate government) may have led to a better result.

Anyway, I don't think that anyone could debate that a functioning democracy which includes strong and lawful institutions would benefit Iraqis. The fact that this state of affairs hasn't occurred yet doesn't disprove this idea. This same rationale rebuts Klein's criticism of #s 5, 6, & 7. They could all be true in an alternate world where Iraq has a functioning, democratic, stable government. But since that prerequisite doesn't exist, you can't disprove the hypothesis.

As to #8... I have no idea what Klein is talking about. Does he have any reason to believe that if we had never invaded Iraq that al-Qaeda would've just rolled over and left us alone in perpetuity? I've never heard anyone even attempt to make that case, much less prove it. It's a ridiculous assumption on the face, and Klein doesn't even bother presenting a single piece of evidence in support. Or even an intellectual argument without evidence. Perhaps he has something well-thought in mind, but he doesn't mention it, and I've not seen or heard it.

Finally, this was not the entire pro-war case. Packer was a moderate supporter of the war in the run-up, but he is certainly not an apologist for neoconservatism. And he left out a central point: Saddam's direct support and approval of international terrorism, gangsterism, war crimes, and direct acts of war against the U.S.

To the first point: Saddam sheltered Ramzi Yousef, the bomber of the WTC in 1993. Yousef entered the U.S. on an Iraqi visa to conduct that attack, and was given safe haven in Iraq (with Saddam's direct knowledge) after the fact. His uncle, who advised him in planning that attack and gave him funding for that end, is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed: mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. This point, also, is not under debate. But Saddam's direct ties to terrorism don't end there, since al-Zarqawi, the late leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq and former lieutenant to bin Laden, was granted entrance to Iraq after the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan (where he had previously operated) but before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In other words, even if Saddam were not affiliated with al-Qaeda before 9/11, he most certainly was after that event. His public cheering of the 9/11 attacks immediately after the fact is likewise despiscable.

To the second: Saddam attempted to assassinate a former President of the United States -- George H.W. Bush -- in April 1993. This alone was justification for Saddam's removal.

To the third: Saddam's war crimes and genocidal attempts are well documented, and I won't rehash them here.

To the fourth: Saddam fired on U.S. airplanes patrolling the Iraqi no-fly zone nearly every day for nearly a decade. This prompted the Clinton administration to engage in many small-scale interventions and retaliations, and to eventually conclude that regime-change in Iraq through American intervention was necessary and inevitable.

Also, yes... Iraqis were suffering under sanctions. But these were not "our sanctions". They were sanctions agreed upon by the U.N., and levied by that body. They were, in other words, the result of the sort of non-interventionary diplomacy that Mr. Klein supposedly prefers. And that resulted in an estimated 1 million+ Iraqis dead from lack of proper food, water, and medical supplies; the corrupted Oil-for-Food program, and the continuing presence of Saddam and brutalization of his people.

Now, Klein says that "literally every element of the anti-war case has been proven correct." This is patently false. For example, anti-war claim #1: I guess it depends on what Mr. Klein means when he says that containment "worked". If he means that it prevented Saddam from expressly invading another country *again*, then I suppose he is correct. But by nearly any other metric, the policy of "containment-via-sanctions-and-continuous-military-patrols" failed miserably.

As I mentioned before, #2 is likewise invalid. The U.S. had been directly provoked by Saddam, when he attempted to assassinate a former president, when he fired upon U.S. military planes patrolling no-fly zones on a daily basis, and when he harbored international terrorists who directly attacked the United States. All of these are clear incitements to war. And as to the "international support" argument: some 40-odd countries contributed troops to our cause. Others offered monetary support, and others offered verbal support. There was substantial international support for intervention. I don't know what the official standard is for the exact appropriate level of international support, or which countries get the most-heavily weighted vote in the matter. But to say that this war was unilateral is simply untrue.

#3, I guess, is true. Casualties were inevitable. But casualties were also inevitable if we didn't intervene. After all, Saddam wasn't known for his kindness to his fellow Iraqis. Neither were his sadistic sons, who were slated to obtain absolute power after Saddam died. Indeed, Saddam had to reign them in. It's probably true that if we hadn't invaded Iraq that civilian casualties would be lower. But the same would have been true if al-Zarqawi -- who single-handedly escalated the sectarian violence to its most obscene levels, and whose barbarities were even shunned by bin Laden -- were not in the country, and of course he was permitted to enter by Saddam's government. So who has done the most damage? The answer isn't so obvious.

#4 is demonstrably false, at least to this point in time.

#5 is unfalsifiable at this point, and may still be unproven in time. In any case, the argument stings of xenophobia. As in, "those savages couldn't manage a democracy. Too uncivilized."

I suppose that #6 is arguable. I think Pres. Bush's policy aims were obvious -- i.e. to remake the MidEast in such a way as to attack international terrorism and promote global stability. To that end, he became the first U.S. president to call for a Palestinian state, and he worked to bring Arab/Muslim allies into the the fold (e.g. Pakistan, Turkey, Bahrain, U.A.B., etc.). In addition, Libya was persuaded to give up its nuclear program, and rallied the international community in opposition to Iran's efforts to develop one. These are no small movements, but they've been almost universally ignored.

#7 is probably true, but that's as much of an indictment against anti-war proponents as it is against the decision to invade Iraq.

#8 is a question of semantics. After all, al-Qaeda's largest presence in the world now is in Iraq. The largest incidences of global terrorism all occur in Iraq. After the invasion of Afghanistan during which most of the senior al-Qaeda leaders fled, what were we to do? Just let them run to Pakistan? To Iraq? To Syria? To Saudi Arabia? Major terrorist operations exist and existed in all of those places. If we withdraw, then we are refusing to fight terrorism where it is most endemic. Anyway, the same rationale presented in #8 would preclude invading Afghanistan.

I'm sorry for the length of this, but Klein's sort of shoddy thinking demands a full rebuttal.

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Wednesday, August 15, 2007

The Giuliani Doctrine

Matthew Yglesias destroys Rudy's recent essay in Foreign Affairs. It's worth reading the whole post, but here's the upshot:

The result of this policy is going to be an endless series of wars, a bankrupt country accounting for way more than fifty percent of world defense expenditures, fewer and fewer countries willing to cooperate with us on key priorities and, perhaps worst of all, more and more nuclear proliferation as countries decide its not safe to live in a world where the Rudy-led USA is the big kid on the block.
I don't think he's over-stating the case. After all, Giuliani's chief foreign policy advisor is Norman Podhoretz -- who is already on record as saying that the Iraq War "couldn't have gone better," and who wants to unilaterally bomb Iran -- and Giuliani has been the most hawkish of the the GOP candidates in the debates.

Giuliani must be opposed. At all costs.

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Monday, July 30, 2007

The New Anglo-American Relations

Brown and Bush project a united front, but it's difficult to believe that U.S./U.K. relations will be as cozy as they have been since Blair took office and allied himself with Clinton and Bush. The war in Iraq certainly took their toll on Blair, and Brown seems prepared to not make the same mistake. At the same time, he recognizes the need to stay close to the U.S. As the global power dynamics shift from Old Europe (U.K., France, Germany) to New Asia (China, India) in the coming decades, the U.K. will have to stay close to the U.S. to maintain any significant global influence. The U.S. needs the U.K. as an ally in Europe, as the Old World becomes more and more resentful of the U.S.'s hegemony. A few interesting things from the article:

Mr. Brown, who has eschewed the use of the phrase “war on terrorism,” nonetheless hailed Mr. Bush’s leadership in his campaign against terrorism. “In this century, it has fallen to America to take center stage,” he wrote. “And let me acknowledge the debt the world owes to the United States for its leadership in this struggle.”
This is an important point which is often lost in the discussion over Iraq. Only the U.S. has the global military capabilities to truly fight terrorist organizations and control rogue states. And the U.K. (and perhaps France and Germany) face a much stronger terrorist threat than we do. If we decide to just let everyone fend for themselves, it could happen at the detriment of the U.K. and Europe.

On the flip: the U.K. faces more exposure to domestic Islamic terrorist threats than the U.S. does, but that also gives them more opportunities to gain intelligence on global networks which threaten Western democracies. The U.S.'s opportunities are essentially limited to Iraq and Afghanistan, and those gains have (obviously) been limited. Indeed, we might be making the situation worse for ourselves in those places. Keeping Europe on our side in the struggle against terrorism is essential, and the U.K. is uniquely positioned to do that.

Elsewhere:

But even the opinion article pointed up subtle differences, for instance with Mr. Brown referring to the acts of such groups as Al Qaeda as “a crime,” and citing the importance of law enforcement in combating terrorists.

During the 2004 presidential race, Mr. Bush and his re-election campaign had leveled harsh criticism against his Democratic opponent, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts, for referring to law enforcement action against terrorism, saying it proved Mr. Kerry did not view the threat seriously. Mr. Bush usually refers to terrorist attacks as acts of war.

Asked today whether Mr. Brown’s approach to terrorist groups represented an underlying difference of philosophy, Mr. Bush said it did not and acknowledged that law enforcement tools are part of the fight against terrorism.

This is the biggest wedge between the U.S. and the rest of the Western democracies. They (rightly) view terrorist actions as international criminal activity, like drug smuggling or arms sales. Obviously, if a specific foreign nation directly subsidizes such criminal actions, then they may be treated as acts of war (e.g. Afghanistan). But to the extent that these actions are being conducted by individual, multinational, private groups, they should be treated as crimes rather than acts of war. This is a fundamental philosophical difference between Europe and the U.S. They view Gitmo and the suspension of Habeas Corpus and the denial of Geneva protections as ridiculous abuses of power, and they are right. Bush views them as necessary (and, supposedly, temporary) actions in a time of indefinite war. Bush's thinking is fundamentally flawed, for a number of reasons which I won't bother going into during this post. Needless to say, he comes across as an authoritarian, and Europe likes nothing less than that. They learned their lessons w/r/t executive abuses of power in the 20th century. That, along with the chip on their shoulder which comes from being second-rate powers now, will preclude them from buying whatever America is selling without asking questions.

The next U.S. president will an immediate opportunity to ingratiate him/herself with the rest of the world: He can formally apologize for Abu Ghraib, close Gitmo and send everyone there to an international tribunal or trials in their own countries, present legislation to Congress to revoke the Military Commissions Act, proclaim that the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques" ended with the Bush administration, and reinstate the Writ of Habeas Corpus. Hillary Clinton won't do any of these. Neither will Giuliani or Romney. McCain might do a few. Obama is probably the best chance for a severe straightening of our legal system w/r/t detainees. In the linked article, Bush said that the U.S. and U.K. remain strong allies because "We have common interests throughout the world, but it’s an important relationship primarily because we think the same: We believe in freedom and justice as fundamentals in life." The rest of the world isn't buying it for obvious reasons. The next U.S. president will have the chance to change that perception.

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