Wednesday, March 12, 2008

It's Official

The Pentagon finally confirms what we already know: there was no link between Saddam and al-Qaida before 9/11. However, it also confirms what many of us also already knew: there were tons of links between Saddam and other terrorist groups.

An exhaustive review of more than 600,000 Iraqi documents that were captured after the 2003 U.S. invasion has found no evidence that Saddam Hussein's regime had any operational links with Osama bin Laden's al Qaida terrorist network.

The Pentagon-sponsored study, scheduled for release later this week, did confirm that Saddam's regime provided some support to other terrorist groups, particularly in the Middle East, U.S. officials told McClatchy. However, his security services were directed primarily against Iraqi exiles, Shiite Muslims, Kurds and others he considered enemies of his regime.

If anyone is still interested in this, Regime of Terror has fairly exhaustively cataloged Saddam's terrorist ties. They have also compiled evidence of cooperation between the remnants of the Ba'ath Party (of which Saddam was a chief member) and al-Qaida post 9/11. In other words, it's not that Saddam's ideology was incompatible with al-Qaida's (or other terrorists'), but rather that they just hadn't hooked up together quite yet.

That said, it's still a pretty damning indictment of the competence/integrity of the Bush administration.

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Monday, January 28, 2008

The Incompetence of the C.I.A.

Following 9/11, Bush instructed the C.I.A. to develop an interrogation program. The trouble?

But the program that developed within the Central Intelligence Agency after 9/11 has left the intelligence community playing a fateful role. Surprising as it may be, the CIA has never really been in the interrogation business. After 9/11, it turned its back on its own limited history of interrogations and never consulted those in the U.S. with solid experience in that difficult art. Even in the seven years since it has built an interrogation capability mostly from scratch, the agency has never applied the best practices in behavioral science to improve its regimen. The result has been to privilege brutality out of ignorance, which, according to many experts and insiders interviewed, means that interrogation practices that produce faulty information are now at the very heart of the U.S. efforts against a mysterious and still-unfamiliar enemy.

In short, despite innumerable statements from the Bush administration about the value of the CIA’s interrogation program, U.S. interrogators are still mostly in the dark—in the dark not only about al-Qaeda, but about how to effectively elicit vital national-security information from the detainees in its custody.

Those with intimate knowledge of the program say that in many cases, U.S. interrogators haven’t even been able to learn the basics about many of those they hold or have held, to say nothing of whatever crucial information they possess. "How do you separate the sheep from the wool? There’s no fingerprints, no DNA," said a former senior intelligence official who helped set up the CIA’s interrogation program, and who would not speak for attribution. "You don’t know if you have Osama bin Laden or Joe Shit the rag-man."

Worse than a crime, to paraphrase Tallyrand, interrogation by the CIA has been—and remains—a blunder.

But it didn't have to be this way:

Despite having nearly no off-the-shelf experience, the CIA was tasked by President Bush to come up with a robust interrogation program for the most important al-Qaeda captives. So the agency turned to its partners for assistance in designing its interrogation regimen: Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia—all countries cited by the State Department for using torture—among others. Additionally, as Mark Benjamin has reported for Salon, two psychologists named Bruce Jessen and James Mitchell, who worked as contractors for CIA, helped the agency "reverse-engineer" the military and CIA training on resisting torture for use on detainees. Suddenly, waterboarding, an illegal practice of simulating or in some cases inducing drowning, became an American-administered practice.

Interestingly, one place that the CIA didn’t look for help was the place where interrogations have been performed, lawfully, for decades: the Federal Bureau of Investigation. "In terms of actual interrogations, when you have a suspect in custody, the FBI does that hundreds of times a day, 365 days a year, for 90 years," said Mike Rolince, who spent over three years as Special Agent in Charge of counterterrorism at the FBI’s Washington field office before retiring in October 2005. "The FBI brought serious credibility and a track record to the table. That said, the U.S. government decided to go about [interrogations] in a different way. The results speak for themselves. I don’t think we need to be where we are."

The entire article, by Spencer Ackerman, is well worth reading. The incompetence and mendacity of Bush in this area is a national shame, and all of future history will scorn us.

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Saturday, January 12, 2008

Krugman's pessimism

Megan McArdle points us to QandO, where we find that Paul Krugman has predicted a recession in every single year since Bush came to office (except 2001, Bush's first year, presumably because he hadn't had time to do anything yet):

Like Megan, I think "a recession seems likely-ish", but "Krugman predicts" is generally a good sign to bet the other way.

  • "[R]ight now it looks as if the economy is stalling..." — Paul Krugman, September 2002

  • "We have a sluggish economy, which is, for all practical purposes, in recession..." — Paul Krugman, May 2003

  • "An oil-driven recession does not look at all far-fetched." — Paul Krugman, May 2004

  • "[A] mild form of stagflation - rising inflation in an economy still well short of full employment - has already arrived." — Paul Krugman, April 2005

  • "If housing prices actually started falling, we'd be looking at [an economy pushed] right back into recession. That's why it's so ominous to see signs that America's housing market ... is approaching the final, feverish stages of a speculative bubble." — Paul Krugman, May 2005

  • "In fact, a growing number of economists are using the "R" word [i.e., "recession"] for 2006." - Paul Krugman, August 2005

  • "But based on what we know now, there’s an economic slowdown coming." - Paul Krugman, August 2006

  • "this kind of confusion about what’s going on is what typically happens when the economy is at a turning point, when an economic expansion is about to turn into a recession" - Paul Krugman, December 2006

  • "Right now, statistical models ... give roughly even odds that we’re about to experience a formal recession. ... [T]he odds are very good — maybe 2 to 1 — that 2007 will be a very tough year." - Paul Krugman, December 2006

Atrios, Huffington Post, Media Matters/Eric Boehlert, The Daily Show's Jon Stewart and Glenn Greenwald are constantly telling me things like how "it's worth taking note of just how constantly wrong all of our Most Serious Political Analysts are" (Glenn Greenwald, again) and how there should be some sort of consequence for that sort of relentless wrongness. Doesn't seem to apply to their own, though.


Krugman's latest column? He predicts a pretty horrible recession which the Fed is powerless to control or stop.

I think the likelihood of a recession is pretty strong. But I don't expect it to be especially long or especially deep. Still, the fact that Krugman is now predicting one for '08 gives me pause, and reminds me of Lewis Black's joke:

"President Bush now says that he believes in global warming. As a result, I'm no longer sure."

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Thursday, November 15, 2007

IR in Theory and Practice

Daniel Drezner jumps into a debate about the utility of International Relations Theory, particularly as it pertains to students getting policy M.A. degrees:

Patrick Thaddeus Jackson and Rob Farley have fired additional volleys on the utility of an M.A. in international relations.

Except that with this round, the debate is actually about something more fundamental -- the utility of international relations theory to policymaking.

These paragraphs suggest where Jackson is coming from:

[W]here it gets controversial is the relationship between scholarship and object. We have two ideal-typical positions on this: scholarship ought to improve practice, and scholarship can't possibly improve practice, at least not directly. Rob clearly prefers door #1; I prefer door #2. Rob's position is the classic Enlightenment hope for the sciences of society: place practice on a more rational basis, achieve better results, produce a world that looks more like the world we want to live in; I think that's both dangerous and a little naive -- dangerous because it puts a potential transcendental justification for coercion in the hands of would-be reformers (after all, if the experts told us that we can do this, and you disagree, then you're either stupid or obstinate, and in either way you're in the way so forcibly removing you starts to look like a good idea) and naive because it presumes that scholarly knowledge translates more or less simply to the actual world (and once again, if it doesn't, maybe we ought to use force to make the world look more like the model . . .).

I prefer option #2 -- scholarship can't possibly improve practice, at least not directly -- in part because people claiming to have Reason/God/Truth on their sides ("Jesus/Buddha/Muhammad/science likes my policy better!") have been responsible for most of the senseless death in human history, in part because systematic scholarly knowledge is by nature an abstraction (and sometimes a severe abstraction, in which the actual practice of anyone in particular disappears -- the sports analogy here would be to sabremetric analyses of baseball, and we've seen what happens when actual baseball teams try to directly implement strategies that look valid sabremetrically) and therefore not fit for any sort of direct translation into practice, and in part because scholarly knowledge is irreducibly perspectival and thus does not seem to me to be a good solid basis for decision-making (although it can certainly inform decision-making as one element among others).

Farley's response to this is here. My response is below the fold....

From this excerpt, I've concluded that Jackson is likely correct that he should not be teaching anyone in an M.A. program. I am more skeptical that this stricture should be applied to others.

The problem with Jackson's argument is that it sets up a false dichotomy. Neither ideal type holds, and most profs in policy schools are smart enough to know that. International relations theory provides some useful constructs through which one can interpret world politics. Now -- and this is important -- they are far from perfect. Most IR theories -- hell, most social science theories -- do a much better job at after-the-fact explanation than before-the-fact prediction. In teaching them, therefore, one has to be wary of having your students believe that what they are learning is some sort of gospel. [This, by the way, is one reason why an M.A. has value-added -- most M.A. students eventually realize that sometime there is no right answer to a question. B.A. students are more reluctant to believe that the Wizards of IR are not all-powerful.]

Why teach theory at all, then? Two quick answers. First. to paraphrase Churchill, IR theory is a lousy rotten way of understanding the world -- until you consider the alternatives. Policymakers who claim to disdain abstract theories just use implicit ones -- poorly chosen historical analogies, bad metaphors, you name it. Jackson's "intellectually isolationist" approach to teaching policy doesn't make the situation any better -- it just deprives would-be policymakers of a component in their analytical tool kit.

Second, good teachers don't just teach the strengths of a particular theoretical approach -- they also teach the weaknesses and blind spots of each approach. This is the "procedural liberalism" that Michael Berube is so fond of. As Farley puts it:

Why wouldn't it be better if the policymakers in question had some theoretical training, such that they could, on their own, evaluate elements of the claims that the scholars are making? This IS teaching students; it's teaching students to be better, more critical policymakers.
Teaching students theoretical concepts and how to critique them is a two-fer. Hopefully, it provides them with some useful knowledge about how the world works. More importantly, however, it should teach them how to judge for themselves about how the world works. That's the best way to get students to temper the idealism that scares the crap out of Jackson.

Oh, one last point -- Jackson's sabremetric metaphor is crap. The Boston Red Sox have been successful in the past half-decade because of a combination of sabremetric analysis, traditional scouting, and a larger budget to fill out the roster. Sabremetrics was not solely responsible -- but without it, there's no way they win two World Series either.

This is how IR scholarship should be viewed as well -- an insufficient but necessary base of knowledge from which one can craft effective policies.



first of all, the word is "sabermetrics," not "sabremetrics".

secondly, a better example of sabermetric success would surely be the Oakland A's, who are perennial contenders despite having a very small (relative) budget. Billy Beane operates almost purely on sabermetric knowledge.

thirdly, the most telling evidence that sabermetrics is successful is that... every team in baseball now uses these metrics. Some give them more relative weight than others, and some have big enough budgets to make some "mistake signings" and absorb the blow, but all teams use sabermetrics now, especially in drafting. The early adopters have had the most success. Now, the gains are marginal, but the consequences of ignoring sabermetrics would likely be disastrous.

Now, to the topic at hand: clearly Drezner is right. Jackson sets up a straw man within a false dichotomy, and of course has no trouble knocking it down. but IR Theory, like any other theory in any other discipline, has value in setting parameters for understanding actual situations. Some theories demonstrate some predictive power, and those theories are kept and (hopefully) refined. Others don't. And, to quote Keynes, as the facts change, good scholars (or policy-makers) should change their minds. Dogmatic defense of theory in spite of all evidence to the contrary is clearly counter-productive, but so is ignoring the theoretical debate altogether in favor of flying blindly.

It seems clear not that the Bush administration's misadventure in Iraq is not the fault of their application of a theory, but of applying the wrong theory. It was their ignorance of the broad theoretical discussion in favor of dogmatic approval of one theory -- neoconservatism as a model for the Middle East -- that cost them, not their knowledge.

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Tuesday, November 6, 2007

Another Bush Achievement

Turkey's threatened incursions into Iraqi Kurdistan had me nervous a few weeks ago. Now, Bush has achieved a modest victory on that front, after engaging in some of that good 'ole diplomacy of which he is usually not capable:

Fortunately for both sides, yesterday's White House encounter produced a solution that allowed both sides to step back from the brink. Bush not only declared the Kurdistan Workers' Party (or PKK), "an enemy of Turkey, a free Iraq and the United States," but also committed to providing actionable intelligence to Ankara on the whereabouts of PKK positions. Officially, Bush publicly stuck to the line that Iraq's territory should not be violated. In practice, though, the United States would cooperate "in order to chase down people who murder people," Bush pledged. Essentially, that appears to be a green light for the Turks to carry out limited raids into Iraqi territory with the blessing of the United States. And, crucially, it also allows Erdogan to call off a full-scale land invasion—though he stressed that that option remained on the table if raids proved unsuccessful.

"Finally, we have a plan of action," says one senior Turkish official not authorized to speak on the record. "We are tired of promises with no action."

Getting to this agreement was the result of weeks of intense behind-the-scenes diplomacy by the administration.
(ht: Daniel Drezner)

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Saturday, November 3, 2007

One Positive Achievement by Bush

Bush's blunderings are always noted, but he has does a few things right, especially in the area of non-proliferation. During Bush's tenure, and because of his actions, Libya has abandoned its nuke program, Pakistan has deposed A.Q. Khan and closed off his weapons running operations, and N. Korea is disabling its program beginning tomorrow. These are real accomplishments, and not to be forgotten.

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Thursday, September 6, 2007

Not this again

For some reason, people are still arguing over supply-side economics (particularly, the Laffer curve). This centers on a new book by TNR senior editor Jonathan Chait, who has a forth-coming book entitled The Big Con: The True Story of How Washington Got Hoodwinked and Hijacked by Crackpot Economics (an excerpt may be found here). This book was great when Paul Krugman wrote it in the early-90s as a criticism of Reaganomics (Peddling Prosperity), but the current crop of GOP fiscal idiots don't follow the same pattern. Well, I don't know. The point -- just how influential is extreme supply-side economics these days -- is being debated all over the blogosphere.

Megan McArdle says that Chait's case is "overblown". Matthew Yglesias disagrees, and quotes a bunch of people (Bush, Cheney, etc.) spouting off supply-side nonsense. McArdle rejoinders by accusing Chait (and Ezra Klein, who had come to Chait's defense) of setting up supply-siders as straw men, knocking them down, and then concluding that tax cuts aren't a good idea. Yglesias responds by saying that Chait hasn't done this at all. Brad DeLong and Mark Thoma take Yglesias' side. Tyler Cowen takes McArdle's. Greg Mankiw thanks McArdle for defending him and Glenn Hubbard from inappropriate accusations.

It's weird, because the question isn't whether or not extreme supply-siders, inspired by the Laffer curve, are right or wrong when they say that tax cuts will pay for themselves by boosting economic growth enough to boost government revenues. Everyone agrees that this is ludicrous. The question isn't even over whether or not tax cuts can be good for economic growth. Everyone agrees that this is true. The question isn't even whether or not tax cuts can improve economic growth enough to for themselves in the context of the entire economy. Everyone agrees that this is true. The question is: how influential is the Laffer curve in the GOP leadership?

My guess, although it's impossible to know for sure, is that the idea might still hold some sway among late-70s/early-80s true believers left over from the Reagan administration (e.g. Cheney), or among people who don't know anything at all about economics (e.g. Bush), but that the idea is completely devoid of intellectual backing at this point. There aren't any notable economists who support extreme supply-siderism (that i know of), and I'd be willing to wager that even the Cheneys and Bushes of the world know that the things they say are untrue (or, at least, are possibly untrue).

So... the divergence. McArdle (and Cowen) sees the complete lack of intellectual support for these ideas on the right, and conclude that the ideas are no longer influential. Chait and Yglesias see the words of the national leadership of the GOP giving lip-service to these ideas, and conclude that they still hold sway. Who is right?

Neither, really. Well, both, I guess. Yglesias backs into it:

Meanwhile, the reason people like Jon and I and other liberals spend so much time pointing out that this claim is false is precisely the same as the reason conservatives spend so much time defending it: it's an extremely potent political claim.
McArdle's right; supply-siderism is no longer intellectually influential. The Yglesias/Chait contingent is also right: these things are still in the political discussion, and the Bush admin. still uses them as potent political weapons to convince voters to pass tax cuts. The Bush admin. doesn't actually believe that the tax cuts will pay for themselves, but a lot of other people do. And plus, if they can convince people of it, then the opposition for tax cuts disappears. The trade-off is gone... tax cuts come with no downside.

Alex Tabarrok issues a challenge to Yglesias, et al:

Following Jon Chait, Matt Yglesias writes:

...the central element of the Republican Party's tax policy -- lower taxes rates will lead to higher tax revenues -- is a discredited crackpot notion.

Fine, but a more fruitful question which I'd like to see Yglesias, Chait and others grapple with is why discredited, crackpot ideas can become central elements of a winning political party in the world's most important democracy. Explain the demand side and give us your policy prescriptions.

I answer him, and the underlying debate, in the comments:

Alex -

I assume you've read Caplan's book? I think you'll find your answer there. Unfortunately, there is no workable "policy prescription" which will make voters rational alluvasudden. The work of the reality-based economists and politicos is to educate people to the *true* costs and benefits of policy, and punish those who knowingly lie about them.

everyone acknowledges that the Laffer curve does exist. The question is, which side of the curve are we on? The GOP folks that Yglesias is talking about have a prior assumption that tax cuts (esp. the top marginal rates) are always a good end, but they recognize that this is a normative judgment which isn't universally persuasive. so, to gain support for their preferred policies, they engage in intellectual dishonesty by arguing that the U.S. economy is on the right side of the Laffer peak, when in fact we are on the left side of it.

Right-wing economists who are not intellectually dishonest -- like Greg Mankiw and Glenn Hubbard -- do not do this. They acknowledge that, given the economic realities in the U.S., further tax cuts will not pay for themselves; they are in favor of tax cuts despite what they will do to federal revenues, because they believe that tax cuts are good things in and of themselves. But their bosses don't think that this is a politically feasible argument, so they lie and deceive. This drives left-wing economists (e.g. "Rubinomics" folks) and left-wing literate politicos absolutely batty, and understandably so. They are prevented from having a debate on the merits, because the extreme supply-siders won't acknowledge reality before coming to the debate.

Yglesias (and Chait) are not arguing against Mankiw; they are arguing against the WSJ editorial page, the Heritage Foundation, Pres. Bush, V.P. Cheney, etc.

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Another Blow to Bush

A federal judge has struck down the provision in the PATRIOT Act allowing the federal government to demand the internet records of Americans from internet service providers without notifying their customers or obtaining a court order. The judge rightfully ruled that the provision "offends the fundamental Constitutional principles of checks and balances and separation of powers".

This is another example of the judiciary working to restrain the authoritarian impulses of the Bush administration, despite Congress' unwillingness to do so. I'm sure the ruling will be challenged, and will probably end up in the Supreme Court. But the basic principle is sound: the President ought not be able to spy on American citizens without oversight.

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Monday, September 3, 2007

Interesting Bush Revelation

Buried in a mostly-inconsequential article on Bush's state of mind last December, and his plans for the future, there is a very interesting anecdote:

Mr. Bush acknowledged one major failing of the early occupation of Iraq when he said of disbanding the Saddam Hussein-era military, “The policy was to keep the army intact; didn’t happen.”

But when Mr. Draper pointed out that Mr. Bush’s former Iraq administrator, L. Paul Bremer III, had gone ahead and forced the army’s dissolution and then asked Mr. Bush how he reacted to that, Mr. Bush said, “Yeah, I can’t remember, I’m sure I said, ‘This is the policy, what happened?’ ” But, he added, “Again, Hadley’s got notes on all of this stuff,” referring to Stephen J. Hadley, his national security adviser.

It would be nice to actually see those notes, but the point is important. Earlier in the piece, Bush takes full responsibility for the decision to go to war in Iraq ("This group-think of ‘we all sat around and decided’ — there’s only one person that can decide, and that’s the president"), but apparently delegated all authority over the occupation to Bremer, to the point that he was actually surprised and dismayed by Bremer's management. It's amazing to me that Bush was so disconnected from the actual policy decisions of the CPA, and it may have doomed the entire Iraq enterprise. The decision to put all authority in the hands of Bremer instead of splitting it with Khalilzad as initially planned had worse ramifications than Bush could've imagined, but the decision to do so still falls on him.

So, why did Bush give Bremer the Presidential Medal of Freedom?

UPDATE: Paul Bremer calls Pres. Bush a liar. He says that Bush knew about the plan to dissolve the Iraqi army, and he's got letters to prove it:

A previously undisclosed exchange of letters shows that President Bush was told in advance by his top Iraq envoy in May 2003 of a plan to “dissolve Saddam’s military and intelligence structures,” a plan that the envoy, L. Paul Bremer, said referred to dismantling the Iraqi Army.

...

After recounting American efforts to remove members of the Baath Party of Saddam Hussein from civilian agencies, Mr. Bremer told Mr. Bush that he would “parallel this step with an even more robust measure” to dismantle the Iraq military.

One day later, Mr. Bush wrote back a short thank you letter. “Your leadership is apparent,” the president wrote. “You have quickly made a positive and significant impact. You have my full support and confidence.”

On the same day, Mr. Bremer, in Baghdad, had issued the order disbanding the Iraqi military. Mr. Bush did not mention the order to abolish the military, and the letters do not show that he approved the order or even knew much about it. Mr. Bremer referred only fleetingly to his plan midway through his three-page letter and offered no details.

...

Mr. Bremer indicated that he had been smoldering for months as other administration officials had distanced themselves from his order. “This didn’t just pop out of my head,” he said in a telephone interview on Monday, adding that he had sent a draft of the order to top Pentagon officials and discussed it “several times” with Mr. Rumsfeld.

A White House official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the White House is not commenting on Mr. Draper’s book, said Mr. Bush indeed understood the order and was acknowledging in the interview with Mr. Draper that the original plan had proved unworkable.

“The plan was to keep the Iraqi Army intact, and that’s accurate,” the official said. “But by the time Jerry Bremer announced the order, it was fairly clear that the Iraqi Army could not be reconstituted, and the president understood that. He was acknowledging that that was something that did not go as planned.”

So let's see those notes, Mr. Hadley.

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Friday, July 20, 2007

Stupidest Blog Post Ever... Context.

So yesterday I wondered if TAPPED had posted the stupidest blog entry ever. Today, we get some context:

RUSSIAN KIDS LEARN PUTIN ROCKS. The Bush years have sucked, but at least American text books aren't edited by the current administration. According to the Washington Post, Russian history and social studies text books "reflect the themes dominating official political discourse here: that Putin restored Russian strength and built what the Kremlin calls a 'sovereign democracy' despite American efforts to isolate the country."

The books say the American empire may be nearing a "final collapse" and that the Ukrainian Orange Revolution snatched a fair victory out of the hands of Russian forces in the country. Stalin is lauded as "the most successful leader of the U.S.S.R."

Creepy.

So the reason why Stalin is more popular than Bush? Because Russians don't enjoy a free press, and are indoctrinated in schools.

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Thursday, July 19, 2007

Stupidest Blog Post Ever?

TAPPED vies for the title with this doozy:

BUSH: LESS POPULAR THAN STALIN. Whenever I see approval ratings for President Bush, I always think of a Harper's Index stat printed in January of 2006 that compared Bush's popularity among Americans to Stalin's popularity among Russians. Of course, that statistic was printed 18 months ago, when the two ratings were neck-in-neck at 37%.

So a new poll from Strategic Vision (via the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel) finding Bush's latest rating at a dismal 19% puts our president a far cry below the iconic leader of an oppressive communist regime who systematically murdered millions through forced famines, labor camps, and political purges. Enough said.

Now, I know there's a bunch of snark here. But to even make this post -- with one eye cocked, I'm sure -- is idiotic for a few reasons.

1. One poll is about a sitting president in one country. The other is about a dead person in another country. Apples and Oranges. But the lack of scientific rigor isn't the main point.

2. Many people in Russia still long for the "good old days" of the Soviet Union. And the Soviet Union was (arguably) at the height of its power during Stalin's reign. It's like Americans being nostalgic for the Greatest Generation and WWII despite the lack of civil rights. The Russian experience over the last decade-and-a-half has not been great, so longing for past glories makes sense. I imagine there are some in Iraq who hated Saddam but would bring him back if they could.

3. Many Russians are probably deluded as to the evils of Stalin. After all, for much of their lives, the education system and media were state-institutions. I know that "de-Stalinization" rectified some of that, but maybe not all of it. Think of how easily we forgive our past presidents for slavery, genocide, and war-mongering.

I could go on, but frankly I'm too flabbergasted.

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