Unfortunately for him, Good Klein sometimes gets too caught up in hyperbole. He is a smart and (usually) reasonable man, but he has written
a horrible blog post:
Before America invaded Iraq, George Packer wrote an article for The New York Times Magazine on the liberal hawks that sought to categorize the pro- and anti-war arguments. Given that you often hear war supporters say that the doves opposed this war for the wrong reasons, it's interesting to see what Packer considered the arguments of the two sides: For War
1. Saddam is cruel and dangerous.
2. Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction and has never stopped trying to develop them.
3. Iraqis are suffering under tyranny and sanctions.
4. Democracy would benefit Iraqis.
5. A democratic Iraq could drain influence from repressive Saudi Arabia.
6. A democratic Iraq could unlock the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate.
7. A democratic Iraq could begin to liberalize the Arab world.
8. Al Qaeda will be at war with us regardless of what we do in Iraq.
Against War
1. Containment has worked for 10 years, and inspections could still work.
2. We shouldn't start wars without immediate provocation and international support.
3. We could inflict terrible casualties, and so could Saddam.
4. A regional war could break out, and anti-Americanism could build to a more dangerous level.
5. Democracy can't be imposed on a country like Iraq.
6. Bush's political aims are unknown, and his record is not reassuring.
7. America's will and capacity for nation building are too limited.
8. War in Iraq will distract from the war on terrorism and swell Al Qaeda's ranks.
So far as I can tell, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 on the pro-war case proved to be entirely wrong. The remaining rationales were that Saddam is a tyrant -- true, but not nearly reason enough to go to war -- and that Iraqis were suffering under sanctions. Our sanctions.
Meanwhile, literally every element of the anti-war case has been proven correct, save for four, which has proven accurate in a low-grade way as Iran has sought to increase its control over its destabilized neighbor.
These were the two cases. They existed -- both of them -- before the conflict. They had, as Packer details, high profile adherents. The anti-war case was internally coherent, rigorous, and in the final analysis, utterly correct. Not accidentally correct, but accurate in its particulars and predictions. No wonder those who got it wrong are so anxious to argue that nobody truly got it right.
A few problems with this. First, numbers 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8 of the pro-war case are not "entirely false". As example, take #2: "Saddam has used weapons of mass destruction and has never stopped trying to develop them." Obviously, this is not
entirely false, since Saddam had used weapons of mass destruction on his own citizens and on Kuwaitis. This is not a point of debate. In addition, there is still strong evidence that Saddam was still pursuing WMD (from his own nuclear scientists, who handed over centrifuges to U.S. troops) and other conventional weapons which he was not permitted to have according to U.N. resolutions (e.g. attempting to purchase cruise missiles off the shelf from A.Q. Khan in Pakistan). Saddam had routinely thrown out or harassed U.N. weapons inspectors. This second point might be debatable, but it's certainly not "entirely false".
#4 hasn't proven to be "entirely false" either, since there has never been democracy in Iraq. The system of government put in place by the Iraqi constitution is consociational, not at all a true democracy. Consociational arrangements can sometimes work (although the point is arguable), but it can also exacerbate pre-existing ethnic/sectarian divisions. In this case, it seems to have done so, and a more democratic system (like single-member districting, for example, which could force representatives to gain approval from segments of all ethnic/sectarian groups, thus fostering a moderate government) may have led to a better result.
Anyway, I don't think that anyone could debate that a functioning democracy which includes strong and lawful institutions would benefit Iraqis. The fact that this state of affairs hasn't occurred yet doesn't disprove this idea. This same rationale rebuts Klein's criticism of #s 5, 6, & 7. They could all be true in an alternate world where Iraq has a functioning, democratic, stable government. But since that prerequisite doesn't exist, you can't disprove the hypothesis.
As to #8... I have no idea what Klein is talking about. Does he have any reason to believe that if we had never invaded Iraq that al-Qaeda would've just rolled over and left us alone in perpetuity? I've never heard anyone even attempt to make that case, much less prove it. It's a ridiculous assumption on the face, and Klein doesn't even bother presenting a single piece of evidence in support. Or even an intellectual argument without evidence. Perhaps he has something well-thought in mind, but he doesn't mention it, and I've not seen or heard it.
Finally, this was
not the entire pro-war case. Packer was a moderate supporter of the war in the run-up, but he is certainly not an apologist for neoconservatism. And he left out a central point: Saddam's direct support and approval of international terrorism, gangsterism, war crimes, and direct acts of war against the U.S.
To the first point: Saddam sheltered Ramzi Yousef, the bomber of the WTC in 1993. Yousef entered the U.S. on an Iraqi visa to conduct that attack, and was given safe haven in Iraq (with Saddam's direct knowledge) after the fact. His uncle, who advised him in planning that attack and gave him funding for that end, is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed: mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. This point, also, is not under debate. But Saddam's direct ties to terrorism don't end there, since al-Zarqawi, the late leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq and former lieutenant to bin Laden, was granted entrance to Iraq after the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan (where he had previously operated) but
before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. In other words, even if Saddam were not affiliated with al-Qaeda before 9/11, he most certainly was after that event. His public cheering of the 9/11 attacks immediately after the fact is likewise despiscable.
To the second: Saddam attempted to assassinate a former President of the United States -- George H.W. Bush -- in April 1993. This alone was justification for Saddam's removal.
To the third: Saddam's war crimes and genocidal attempts are well documented, and I won't rehash them here.
To the fourth: Saddam fired on U.S. airplanes patrolling the Iraqi no-fly zone nearly every day for nearly a decade. This prompted the Clinton administration to engage in many small-scale interventions and retaliations, and to eventually conclude that regime-change in Iraq through American intervention was necessary and inevitable.
Also, yes... Iraqis were suffering under sanctions. But these were not "our sanctions". They were sanctions agreed upon by the U.N., and levied by that body. They were, in other words, the result of the sort of non-interventionary diplomacy that Mr. Klein supposedly prefers. And that resulted in an estimated 1 million+ Iraqis dead from lack of proper food, water, and medical supplies; the corrupted Oil-for-Food program, and the continuing presence of Saddam and brutalization of his people.
Now, Klein says that "literally every element of the anti-war case has been proven correct." This is patently false. For example, anti-war claim #1: I guess it depends on what Mr. Klein means when he says that containment "worked". If he means that it prevented Saddam from expressly invading another country *again*, then I suppose he is correct. But by nearly any other metric, the policy of "containment-via-sanctions-and-continuous-military-patrols" failed miserably.
As I mentioned before, #2 is likewise invalid. The U.S. had been directly provoked by Saddam, when he attempted to assassinate a former president, when he fired upon U.S. military planes patrolling no-fly zones on a daily basis, and when he harbored international terrorists who directly attacked the United States. All of these are clear incitements to war. And as to the "international support" argument: some 40-odd countries contributed troops to our cause. Others offered monetary support, and others offered verbal support. There was substantial international support for intervention. I don't know what the official standard is for the exact appropriate level of international support, or which countries get the most-heavily weighted vote in the matter. But to say that this war was unilateral is simply untrue.
#3, I guess, is true. Casualties were inevitable. But casualties were also inevitable if we didn't intervene. After all, Saddam wasn't known for his kindness to his fellow Iraqis. Neither were his sadistic sons, who were slated to obtain absolute power after Saddam died. Indeed, Saddam had to reign them in. It's probably true that if we hadn't invaded Iraq that civilian casualties would be lower. But the same would have been true if al-Zarqawi -- who single-handedly escalated the sectarian violence to its most obscene levels, and whose barbarities were even shunned by bin Laden -- were not in the country, and of course he was permitted to enter by Saddam's government. So who has done the most damage? The answer isn't so obvious.
#4 is demonstrably false, at least to this point in time.
#5 is unfalsifiable at this point, and may still be unproven in time. In any case, the argument stings of xenophobia. As in, "those savages couldn't manage a democracy. Too uncivilized."
I suppose that #6 is arguable. I think Pres. Bush's policy aims were obvious -- i.e. to remake the MidEast in such a way as to attack international terrorism and promote global stability. To that end, he became the first U.S. president to call for a Palestinian state, and he worked to bring Arab/Muslim allies into the the fold (e.g. Pakistan, Turkey, Bahrain, U.A.B., etc.). In addition, Libya was persuaded to give up its nuclear program, and rallied the international community in opposition to Iran's efforts to develop one. These are no small movements, but they've been almost universally ignored.
#7 is probably true, but that's as much of an indictment against anti-war proponents as it is against the decision to invade Iraq.
#8 is a question of semantics. After all, al-Qaeda's largest presence in the world now is in Iraq. The largest incidences of global terrorism all occur in Iraq. After the invasion of Afghanistan during which most of the senior al-Qaeda leaders fled, what were we to do? Just let them run to Pakistan? To Iraq? To Syria? To Saudi Arabia? Major terrorist operations exist and existed in all of those places. If we withdraw, then we are refusing to fight terrorism where it is most endemic. Anyway, the same rationale presented in #8 would preclude invading Afghanistan.
I'm sorry for the length of this, but Klein's sort of shoddy thinking demands a full rebuttal.
Labels: Iraq